I N THIS CONTRIBUTION to the "Notes on Moral Theology," I examine writings over the past three years in areas related to fundamental moral theology. Not surprisingly, the new millennium prompted moral theologians to look ahead, but as they did they also looked back especially at the contributions of a number of moral theologians. These two perspectives serve to frame this article.
I N THIS CONTRIBUTION to the "Notes on Moral Theology," I examine writings over the past three years in areas related to fundamental moral theology. Not surprisingly, the new millennium prompted moral theologians to look ahead, but as they did they also looked back especially at the contributions of a number of moral theologians. These two perspectives serve to frame this article.
LOOKING BACK
Looking back, one finds not surprisingly several worthy and hopeful reflections on moral theology over the past century or since Vatican II. Joseph Selling provides a strong argument for the lasting impact of Janssens's work for fundamental moral theology.
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More frequently, the tributes occur in the form of Festschriften and recently there have been several. For instance, a new one has recently appeared celebrating the life and work of Enda McDonagh. 4 With contributions from Garret Fitzgerald, the former Irish Prime Minister, Mary Robinson, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Seamus Heaney, the Nobel Prize winning poet, and Imogen Stuart, the sculptor, among others, this collection highlights the extensive range of interlocutors that the great Irish moral theologian has engaged.
Charles Curran reflects on McDonagh's theology of morality and notes how the Irish theologian has entered into the life of the Church, its priestly, prophetic and wisdom roles, its liturgy, its Eucharist, and its prayer. Curran also notes that McDonagh has been at pains to avoid an "either/or" theology of contrasts, but rather embraces a "both/and" approach to theology. Thus to appreciate "the tragic and transformative sense of history," McDonagh couples Gaudium et spes with luctus et angor. Yet McDonagh invites his colleagues to theologize with him at the fringe and to include the marginalized who are so often ignored. 5 McDonagh's social location certainly differs from that of 50 years ago when moral theologians advised bishops. But, as McDonagh writes from the fringe even during his "retirement," 6 his colleague Kevin Kelly reflects on the characteristics of a theology of retirement noting "a greater sense of the preciousness of time (kairos)," a greater disposition to the pastoral and to the ambiguous, as well as a greater readiness to take risks. Kelly includes in his observations a remarkable comment from McDonagh that conveys the humility and honesty of one retired on the fringe. Having been invited by another to discover his inner self, McDonagh responded: "When I look within myself, I can never find an inner self. All I can find is a cluster of relationships." 7 Besides McDonagh, Charles Curran has also been saluted in a recent Festschrift. 8 Like McDonagh, Curran has long considered the ecclesial context of moral theology. 9 In this collection of tributes to him, each author focuses on recent innovations in moral theology and locates and critiques Curran's specific contributions to that particular innovation.
Examining Curran's revisionist "creative fidelity," Bryan Massingale argues that in the new millennium moral theologians must move beyond revision, toward offering the Church a faithful or radical reconstruction of the tradition. He explains:
'Reconstruction' emphasizes the need for a more fundamental or 'radical' (in the sense of radix or 'root') rethinking and rearticulation of the demands of faith than that conveyed by the term 'revision.' 'Reconstruction,' moreover, conveys the belief that there are certain aspects of the Catholic ethical tradition that, in the name of Christ, one should not hold in 'fidelity' no matter how 'creatively.' Yet this reconstruction also aims to be 'faithful' to the demands and challenges, the hope and the promise, of the 'classic' events, symbols, narratives, and persons of the Christian faith-events, symbols, narratives, and persons of the Christian faith . . . .
As an example of faithful reconstruction he poses the question: "What are the ethical implications of Jesus' practice of scandalously inclusive table  fellowship?"   10 Massingale's suggestion to reconstruct the tradition places the theologians' agenda on an altogether different track from the contemporary magisterium's own attempts to maintain consistency with the tradition.
11 Still, among moral theologians, Massingale's proposal is a relatively moderate one, somewhat similar to Brian Johnstone's position in his debate with Karl Wilhelm Merks who argues against the tradition's prima facie claims on us.
Massingale intently examines the Catholic moral tradition with its "systemic distortions, unconscious biases, and unacknowledged collusions with human evil." He scrutinizes moral theologians no less, particularly their silence in the face of moral compromise. He refers specifically to his own study of how moral theologians never addressed racism in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. 13 He asks, "why this 'disconnect' between professional reflection and public concern?" He suggests that the disconnect occurred because Catholic moral theologians, being (mal)formed by the systemic distortion of American racism, did not regard African Americans as being among the subjects to whom they should turn.
14 Massingale's call to reconstruct the tradition requires therefore an attentiveness to the subjects whom one must address. In many ways, Massingale wants the moral theologian to look at the fringe to see who has been marginalized by alienating traditions.
Similarly Margaret Farley reflects on the need for the Church to include all its members and their concerns. Inasmuch as all must participate in the moral discernment of the Church, she proposes one of "the least recognized gifts of the Holy Spirit," what she calls, "the grace of self doubt." She explains: "It is a grace for recognizing the contingencies of moral knowledge when we stretch toward the particular and the concrete. It allows us to listen to the experience of others, take seriously reasons that are alternative to our own, rethink our own last word. It assumes a shared search for moral insight, and it promotes (though it does not guarantee) a shared conviction in the end." Farley is particularly concerned with the attempt of church leaders to speak in one voice, but refutes that by saying that to be "a genuinely discerning church" "one voice cannot in fact speak for a divided church." 15 Farley's recognition of the inadequacy of any particular point of view has prompted moral theologians to consider the need to look as well beyond their own perspectives. That need has always been at the source of Curran's call to dialogue and for this reason the editors of the Festschrift James Gustafson proposes six criteria for an ethicist to be ecumenical: to master one's own tradition; to have sufficient knowledge of another tradition's teachings as they pertain to the issues within one's own; to establish an agenda within one's own tradition for a critical dialogue with other traditions; to apply that agenda to other traditions; to employ the comparative method ("The ecumenical moral theologian needs the intellectual skills of a comparativist."); and, to propose "a somewhat systematic, comprehensive, and defended interpretation of Christian ethics . . . that attends to materials from more than one tradition."
16 Certainly Gustafson's promotion of the ecumenical parallels McDonagh's and Curran's recognition of the need to dialogue beyond one's context. Raphael Gallagher picks up on this same theme and specifically evaluates the merits of interfacing Curran's contributions with European interests and notes that the Europeans could learn from Curran about a "soteriological Christology, the understanding of the developmental nature of history, and the validity of a plurality of methods in moral theology." From the Europeans, Curran could "pay greater attention to hermeneutics, have a more philosophically rounded anthropology, and give more attention to the analytic aspects of questions rather than the synthetic aspects." Interestingly, Gallagher laments that both sides "share a major common weakness, the lack of attention to more recent studies on the interpretation of the texts of Vatican II."
17 But the publication of Gallagher's complaint finds a happy coincidence in Leuven's publication of Vatican II and its Legacy. 18 This "tribute" to Vatican II includes two dozen essays and three that specifically deal with moral theology and Gaudium et spes. 19 Joseph Selling proposes the structure of the Vatican document as the foundational outline for fundamental moral theology. 20 Georges De Schrijver comments on how the document has been received and reformulated (progressively 16 Yet another Festschrift is dedicated to Marciano Vidal. Interestingly, the structure of the tribute is similar to Curran's, that is, the editors propose to the contributors that they trace the innovations of the past 30 years on a given topic and evaluate Vidal's involvement with those developments. Moreover, like McDonagh's and Curran's tributes, the editors of this volume also focus on interdisciplinary dialogue. Finally, throughout the volume it celebrates the "style" 24 that we associate with each of these great theologians. In Vidal's case he specifies his style "a morality of pastoral care" ("una moral de la benignidad pastoral") which he associates with the project of Alfonso Liguori. 25 Still, Vidal's Festschrift differs from McDonagh's and Curran's in this: at 1028 pages it has the expansiveness that we have come to expect from Spanish moralists! The work is divided into six sections: the person and the theologian (a study of Vidal himself); the sources of Christian ethics; the foundations of Christian ethics; the person, the core of Christian ethics; the society and its moral dimensions; and, Christian ethics and interdisciplinary dialogue. 21 Georges De Schrijver, "Gaudium et Spes on the Church's Dialogue with Contemporary Society and Culture: A Seedbed for the Divergent Options Adopted at Medellín, Puebla, and Santo Domingo," ibid. 289-327. 22 Throughout, like McDonagh, Vidal sees his work recognizing human suffering and tragedy as well as our hopes and joys. 26 But he also sees it as a work of "liberation" that bears personal costs.
The prolific writer recently commented on the three-year long (December 1997-May 2001) investigation of his four volume work, Moral de Actitudes. 27 He noted the particular "hardness" of the ordeal. Though "Notification" by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith which Vidal signed did not in any way question "the author, his intentionality, the totality of his publications or his ministry," still it declared that Moral de Actitudes was "not to be used for theological formation," a particularly painful decision because the manual was born and used in the context of teaching theology students for several generations. Vidal's comments are instructive. He has remained silent about the investigation for these years for a variety of reasons: his own personal non-aggressive nature, his humility, and his spirituality. But he concluded his interview remembering how the theological tension of the 1950s bore fruit in Vatican II: "my silence does not signify a distrust in either the judgment of history or of God. I believe in the wisdom of the Gospel: 'Nothing hidden will not be revealed. ' " 28 Another Festschrift appeared in India to honor Soosai Arokiasamy. Sherwin offers his own instruction: "The theologian must first and foremost trust that the insights he or she acquires are from the Holy Spirit. As a consequence, the theologian need never fear the interest or interventions of the magisterium concerning his or her work. Although the magisterium is staffed by people with very human failings, it is also the chosen instrument of the Holy Spirit. Thus, if the Spirit allows me to have some insights into the moral implications of the faith, the Spirit will eventually also let the magisterium accept this insight. The Church's first reaction, however, may be negative. The Church may ask the moralist to state his views more clearly. She may even ask him to stop publishing on a given topic or to stop publishing all together. The joy of the Holy Spirit through all this is his faith in the Holy Spirit . . . [T]he vicissitudes of magisterial scrutiny-and I dare say, of Roman intrigue-will only lead the theologian to trust the Lord and the Church ever more deeply. The theologian's obedience to the magisterium, offered from within loving trust in the Holy Spirit, will enable the theologian in illo tempore to sing the glories of God's providential care" (Michael S. Sherwin, "Four Challenges for Moral Theology in the New Century," Logos 6. The thrust of theological thinking of Fr. Arokiasamy is in the line of people's theology and inculturation in the liberative sense . . . . He says that traditional theology, which is deductive, abstract and speculative in method and propositional in nature, is divorced from the actual God's self-communication of people in history, wherein the use of Scripture plays the secondary role of confirmation of doctrine. Hence theology has to go through a conversion from its alienation to a liberative inculturation. This also applies that theologians will have to undergo a deeper conversion from alienation to a solidarity with and a participation in people's lives, cultures and sufferings. Arokiasamy further affirms that in the new method of people's theology, Scripture will be appropriated through a re-reading of it by the people, and tradition will be discerningly re-interpreted by, and integrated into, the people's dynamic and context-related praxis of faith.
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The Festschrift treats globalization from below, the structures of social sin, the eco-crisis and eco-sophy. In short we find an important Indian moral theologian serving the Church on the fringe, promoting reconstruction, looking for dialogue, and invoking the grace of self-doubt, that is, we find the disposition of an active moral theologian in evidence applauded by his constituency which includes major national episcopal leaders. 31 In contrast to many parts of the Church in the industrialized world, the Church in India affords us an image of what could be a good relationship between hierarchy and theologians.
Finally, Bé né zet Bujo and Juvé nal Ilunga Muya provide an extraordinary tribute to the pioneers of African theology. 32 Though not a Festschrift per se, these two editors, the senior African theologian from the Democratic Republic of Congo who teaches at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and the younger Congolese teaching at Rome's Urbaniana, have published a tribute to nine French-speaking African theologians who have paved the way for contemporary African theology (another tribute to English-speaking African theologians is forthcoming).
In a tribute to Bishop Tharcisse Tshibangu, Emmanuel Ntakarutimana 33 While not denying the possibility that his characteristics for an African theology were specifically and irreducibly African, still Tshibangu proposed that certain epistemological insights and local practices were different from European claims. The Belgian Alfred Vanneste, dean of the faculty of theology in Kinshasa responded, affirming the universality of theology and denying the specificity of an African theology. 34 Forty years later, Bujo notes that "Vanneste does not realize that the basic text used for our reflections in matters of faith does not have one single sense." Moreover, Bujo argues that by championing the importance of African theology, Tshibangu implicitly contested the presupposition that "the African tradition has been precisely the weak point of the Africans in the face of Western civilization." Finally, while many want to reduce the "whole question of African theology . . . to social and economic problems," Bujo finds that Tshibangu's proposal offers "an inculturation worthy of the name (that) necessarily ends up in an integral human liberation and development." 35 Anyone interested in the debate between claims of cultural context versus those of universality should read the Tshibangu proposal. He writes: "It is true that we are going towards a universal way of thinking. But the universal civilization will not rise, it would seem on the ruins of particular originalities. It will be made up of particular originalities."
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Within the collection, the finest essay, in my judgment, is Muval's description of the achievement of Bujo. Bujo has developed a "palaver" ethics, a Spanish term meaning "word." Bujo sees palaver ethics as itself effective: through discourse the community comes to resolve crisis, heal the sick, and determine itself for the future. Through palaver the community comes to fuller realization of itself. As Muval writes:
In the logic of the palaver, everyone has the right to speak. In this sense the palaver guarantees equality and everyone's access to speak in view of building up the community. The final decision arrived at its end is not the result of compromise or of voting according to the majority, but of a solid consensus among all members. The fundamental experience at the basis of the word is that of communion . . . 33 Communion is not true unless it promises and guarantees the originality of each member, and unless each member is conscious of not being free except in relation with the community. The reference to the community is the principle that gives foundations and originality to the individual. Individual freedom is not therefore a value absolute in itself, but in relation to the community, in the same sense that the community is not an absolute value but one linked to the individuals.
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In this context the individual is found in the community. Muval takes Bujo's insight: "human understanding is more determined not so much by the Cartesian 'Cogito ergo sum,' as by the 'cognatus sum, ergo sum,' or better by the 'cognati sumus, ergo sumus.' Not even reason can be understood outside of being related."
38 Identity derives from, and is not undermined by, being related.
Furthermore, Muval points out that the community palaver is tridimensional as it engages the ancestors, the living and the not yet born. Thus, there is always a plurality of perspectives, both among the living individuals within the community and by contact with those from the past and expected from the future. Not surprisingly, then, the collection, entitled African Theology in the 21 st Century, anticipates the future by being rooted in the community and in its past, especially in the lives of the pioneers.
With concerns not unlike those of Jean Porter and Lisa Sowle Cahill, Muval echoes Tshibangu and notes: "To reaffirm the centrality of the notion of community in the African view of the world and of the human being is not equivalent to encouraging tribalism, on the contrary it is laying the foundations on which one may think in universal terms. In fact the community, in the African sense, is open to the universal."
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In his own recent work, Bujo develops the dynamics of his ethics as it pertains to leadership. It bears evident significance for all moral theologians as they seek to serve the Church in its search for truth. Bujo describes leadership, not surprisingly, in the key of palaver:
The chief must pay attention to everything that happens in the community. Above all he is obliged to receive everything by patient listening and then to try to digest it well. Being a good listener and digesting the word are linked in general to Black Africa. . . . He is the last to speak, after having carefully examined all the aspects of a problem and digested the word well. But first he must propose his own word for debate, at least in the palaver of the elders. In other words, the word must be made available for rumination. In short, the African palaver is the place where various words are compared, to see whether they have been well received, chewed, and digested, so that they may not bring harm to the community. This in turn presupposes that not only the chief but all the other participants in the palaver have large, broad ears and that they distinguish themselves as listeners before they speak. When they speak, they must be willing to share the word with other members of the palaver, since it is too large and wide for the mouth of one individual. 40 Obviously an ethics of the palaver is highly concrete and specific. Bujo remarks:
[t]he Black African palaver model does not begin with abstractions. It takes up contextual questions and proceeds by way of discourse, without however, narrowing down participation in this discourse to an exclusively intellectual performance . . . The main criterion for evaluating and establishing norms is the life of the individual and of the entire community; the aim is not the realization of isolated individuals . . . but rather a mutual relationship of all persons, which alone can make the human person truly human. 41 Bujo's insights lead us back to the beginning of my segment on "Notes on Moral Theology" where by looking back we find lessons applicable to the way of finding our way forward for the future. In concluding this section, I return to the McDonagh Festschrift and to two remarkable contributions that focus, not surprisingly, on language. The first, an article by Nicholas Lash, describes the importance of conversation in church communal life. He writes: "In a nutshell: the church is the community of those who know the fundamental forms of human speech to be conversation grounded in response to that one Word in whom all things come to be. And theology is the vastly varied forms of language in which this knowledge finds expression and through which it seeks understanding." 42 Lash's evident indebtedness to St. Anselm parallels the interests of Bujo. Similarly, like Bujo, he emphasizes the possibility of conversation in the concrete context as the evidence for the possibility of a broader, nearly universal conversation: " To be human is to be able to speak. But to be able to speak is to be 'answerable', 'responsible', to and for each other and to the mystery of God." 43 Throughout Bujo's work, memory plays such a key role, especially as the community palaver attempts to recall the ancestors. But memory leads us back to an appreciation of the limits of language, even when we most rely on it. In his tribute to McDonagh 
LOOKING FORWARD
When one looks forward, one finds more conversations on several foundational topics that evidence what I consider to be the call to a faithful or radical reconstruction. Those topics include: God talk, Christ talk, sin talk, rule-making talk, and research talk.
God Talk
God talk and its relevance for moral theology have often been sidetracked by a debate between the so-called autonomous ethics and an ethics of faith. These contrasts led to insuperable differences and exclusions. But recent work suggests alternatives to such thinking.
In his work on H. Richard Niebuhr, William Werpehowski turns to Kathryn Tanner who questions those who contrast God's transcendence with our own reality. She writes: "a contrastive definition does not work through the implications of divine transcendence to the end: a God who transcends the world must also . . . transcend the distinctions by contrast appropriate there." God's transcendence appears "in the radical immanence by which God is said to be nearer to us than we are to ourselves." Werpehowski adds: "Thus a theologian need not (and ought not) oppose the order of created causes and effects, willing and doing, behaviors and motivations, to God's creative efficacy." 45 Klaus Demmer has held similar positions. Rather than starting with God as Tanner does, Demmer looks at the anthropological implications of faith and views it as a hermeneutical pre-understanding so that between faith and moral insight there is a fittingness or a convenientia: the moral conduct of the Christian is inseparable from the self-understanding of the Christian. 46 Recently Demmer returned to this earlier interest in asking how grace is made manifest in human action. Locating moral theology in the- 44 ology itself, Demmer asks us about God and the theological nature of moral argument. 47 Tanner also notes that the tendency of theologies to contrast with one another is another mistake. Actually, she argues, theologies complement one another and provide us a fuller understanding of God and God's creation. 48 This attempt to bridge apparently conflicting theologies has been the on-going work of Louvain's É ric Gaziaux who reconciles a morality of faith as developed by Josef Fuchs with an autonomous morality as advocated by Philippe Delhaye. 49 At Utrecht, Frans Vosman reflects on the present where political debate is so exclusive that through some notions of autonomy, theologians relegate the question of God to a solely motivational issue and thereby receive a welcome into political discourse, having abandoned their language of faith. Vosman argues that Catholics surrender too much and need to look within their traditions to see less conflict and more opportunity. Building on Gaziaux (and implicitly on Tanner), he argues for a more modest and accommodating autonomous morality. First, he stresses an anthropological self-understanding that sees the human as being-related (to one another and to God) before being divided and autonomous. Then he turns to the ascetical tradition in which we find two apparently conflicting methods alive and well and enhancing one another: prayer of supplication and prayer of abandonment. Within one tradition we speak freely to God and yet protect the mystery of God. Moralists, Vosman suggests, could employ such an accommodating insight into their debates, by living with both an autonomous morality and a morality of faith. person oriented toward God in heart, mind, and soul and guided by a God who encourages and entices. 51 Other theologians, though not addressing the autonomous debate, turn to God in their writings precisely to promote a more reconciling notion of human flourishment. From Florence, Enrico Chiavacci writes about God's project in history and argues that God's design is for the promotion of the human family as such. Noting that we are at a considerable crossroads with telecommunications affording us an even stronger possibility of promoting the global family, Chiavacci laments that these opportunities are in the hands of private owners whose concerns are not primarily for the common good. Recognizing that such a power often is for alienation and marginalization, Chiavacci argues that theologians could respond to this unchecked dominion by reflecting on the virtue of peace as a constitutive element of the common good for the human family. 52 Noting that theologians have largely ignored this virtue, he calls moralists to a reexamination of it. 53 Similarly, Edward Vacek urges us away from a metaphysical or cosmological understanding of God that tends to obscure the centrality of God's covenant with us. In particular Vacek turns to God's gift of self in order to see how that self-gift makes our mutual love with God possible. 54 Vacek develops these claims further as he looks to gratitude as a proper response and to the human self-understanding that insufficiently grasps the importance and the possibility of mutual love. 55 Throughout these works we see how earlier efforts to develop a more relational theological anthropology has led us to a much more relational understanding of God and way of talking about God.
Christ Talk
A former student of Klaus Demmer, the Brazilian moral theologian Rogue Junges considers moral conduct in the light of the Christ event. Launching his investigation from the ethical meaning of the kingdom of God, revealed in Jesus of Nazareth, Junges sees how human moral action is renewed in Christ. In this perspective he re-elucidates the fundamental categories of the theological ethics: fundamental option, moral conscience, moral values and norms, the sentiment of guilt and sin, theological and moral conversion, moral maturity, and virtues. 56 Following the work of William Spohn, 57 Daniel Harrington and I also use the language of virtue as a bridge from New Testament theology to contemporary moral theology. Like Junges and Spohn we begin inevitably with the kingdom, that is, the end as our point of departure and we couple that as they do with the question of self-understanding in the light of the call to discipleship.
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In a new collection of essays, entitled Thinking of Christ, Lisa Sowle Cahill has the task of commenting on Christ and moral theology and sees instead the greater challenge, outlined by Spohn, of weaving together morality, Christology, and spirituality. When turning specifically to Christology, Cahill follows the same currents that I have noted throughout this "Note," that is, that "either/or" contrasting is not an effective way of proceeding. She writes:
While Christian ethics, in the form of transformationist social and political movements, challenges traditional Christologies, these same movements also rely on and are occasionally challenged by the contours and parameters of historic Christological affirmations. The Christological hermeneutic is always dynamic and circular (from experience to theory and doctrine, and back to experience, then on to reformulated theologies). Christologies from above and below are complementary; moreover, any so-called "Christology from above" once had its origins in Christian experience, and will be tested for continuing relevance to it. Elsewhere two new scholars turn, as did McDonagh, to the tragic for understanding the human and the working of God's grace in Christ. Christopher Steck uses the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar to propose the tragic in the life of Christ so as to help Christians especially when the tragic threatens to undermine the ability to express and find love. Steck stresses less the human's initiative to find flourishment than the faithful call of God who delivers. 60 In light of recent trauma research, Jennifer Beste asks whether Karl Rahner's anthropology adequately appreciates that interpersonal harm can severely and perhaps entirely compromise one's fundamental freedom and that interpersonal love can mediate God's grace. 61 Finally, James Keating and David McCarthy review recent developments in the theology of sanctity and propose the saints not only as (very diverse!) exemplars of moral virtue but more importantly, as able to draw us into their friendship with God. They write: "We wish to explore the way that the lives of the saints, and our remembrance and veneration of them, provide a practical setting for moral reflection, for drawing near to God amid the ordinary, and for living graced and virtuous lives." In their "communion with Christ, we discover who we are." Later, they add, "Through the saints we can learn to see the world as it is in God."
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Sin Talk
In two comprehensive essays, another new (and very prolific) scholar, Darlene Fozard Weaver has proposed a significant agenda for talking about sin. In a review essay published in 2001, Weaver examines five major works on sin that commend "attention to sin-talk because it helps religious ethicists to render more adequately the dynamics of human agency, sociality, and culture and because it raises questions about the nature and task of theology, faith and morality." 63 She concludes her investigation with a comment that reflects the need to not only talk about sin, but also particular sins.
To be sure, we should not reduce sin to sins. Nor should we neglect the fact that in our acts we make and unmake ourselves and others-and that we do so before God. My point is that attention to sin . . . and to sins as particular acts are not separable, correlative aspects of the doctrine of sin; rather attention must be given jointly to sin and to sins because they are interlocking dimensions of a single phenomenon. It is this insight that provides the key to a proper understanding of the relationship of the religious doctrine of sin and the moral domain of interpersonal actions. 64 In 2003 Weaver develops her claim into an admonition as she investigates the work of Charles Curran's (as well as that of Josef Fuchs, Franz Bö ckle, and my own) especially on sin in order to commend on the one hand the attempts to develop a theology of sin, but then, on the other hand, to insist that a comprehensive theology of sin needs to consider "the power of acts in a person's history to make and unmake, to build up and destroy."
Weaver defines sin as "self-estrangement from God and its reflection in moral evil against oneself, others, and the world." 65 She modifies this claim later: "the formal element of sin is its distinctively theological referent, estrangement from God." In search of the material notion of sin, she argues that "a theology of sin requires attention to sin, lest it become thin and abstract." 66 Toward that end, she turns to Jean Porter's works on moral action. Rightly, she argues that "sin always involves a reflexive dimension" and that "our particular sins are more than manifestations of the condition of sin. Sins recoil in a way that involves us more deeply with sin." 67 Interestingly, in her earlier article on sin, she referred to "sins" as little more than a series of questions about discreet acts concerning lust. In this later article, she turns to narrative to describe sins of lust, thereby providing us greater phenomena.
I agree with Weaver and Porter that we need to talk about sin and sins; I admit that many of us, myself included, have not talked about sins. 68 I agree that vicious actions like virtuous actions are reflexive and that sins too are more than manifestations and also reflexive. But I still think that sin and sins, which finds their perfection in malice, are more complicated than they suggest. Rather than using the neo-Scholastic language of formal and material definitions of sin, I think we do better to look at the Gospels. For that reason, I define sin not as alienation or estrangement, though that is the effect of sin, but rather as "the failure to bother to love." 70 I think this leads us to see where the alienation comes from and it suggests how ordinarily and frequently our lives do not express in action the command to love. Where concretely does this happen? In wrong actions like killing, lying, stealing? Probably. But also when we do not visit the imprisoned, ignore Lazarus at the gates, are not vigilant to the return of the Lord, do not love our neighbor, and lack humility, to name a few bad actions. At the end of the day, I think a catalogue of real sins might not only render a more adequate sense of moral accountability; it might prompt us to run to the sacrament of reconciliation and beg for God's mercy and our neighbor's forgiveness. 71 In short, I think that Weaver's admonition about talking about sins is well made, but we may be at the very beginning of trying to take sin seriously.
Finally, defining sin as the failure to bother to love helps, I think, to think of sin both personally and socially. In an article similar to that of Mary Elsbernd cited earlier, Margaret Pfiel presents an important study on the magisterial use of social sin. With great care and precision, Pfiel finds that "magisterial invocation of the language of social sin represents a development of doctrine in process . . . . What began as a reactive measure to circumscribe use of the term 'social sin' in some local ecclesial contexts has lead to a positive appropriation of the language of social sin at the level of the ordinary universal magisterium over the course of John Paul II's papacy."
72 Following Weaver, one needs then to see in Pfiel's research the importance of naming social sins. Aline Kaliban does that to some extent in examining the recent public confessions by church leaders. 73 
Rule-Making Talk
In two very different areas (virtue and globalization) there has been considerable discussion about the nature of rule making. These are the seeds of much more discourse to come.
First, Benjamin Brown attempts to look for the integration of law and virtue through the virtue of obedience in Thomas Aquinas, whereby virtue is ordered to law. Brown's argument on obedience might need further comment as to what Aquinas did think of this virtue/vow.
74 But Brown is interested in capturing yet again the "both/and" of theological research, and here as it specifically applies to the relationship between law and virtue. Moreover, he inevitably returns to the debate that Gaziaux has moderated. Brown writes:
Both are essential for the Christian life, since both draw out certain aspects of it, which would be missing were one to focus exclusively on one or the other. The idea of law captures more the aspect in Christian morality of subjection to God, conformity to Him, and right relation to Him, whereas the idea of virtue captures more the aspect of intrinsic human perfection. To put it another way, the idea of law captures more the aspect of absolute dependence on God, whereas the idea of virtue captures the rightful autonomy of man. Both ideas, however, considered in their totality, contain the primary aspect of the other: true law is always ordered to human perfection, and true virtue is always a conformity and subjection to God.
I have become more convinced, however, that rather than being parallel or compliments, virtue accommodates law. In a very different venue, Lawrence Solum argues that virtue jurisprudence "is a normative and explanatory theory of law that utilises the resources of virtue ethics to answer the central questions of legal theory." Later he explains: "A virtuecentered theory must claim that judicial virtues are a necessary part of the best theory of judging and that judicial virtue plays a central explanatory and normative role. A theory does not lose its status as virtue centered simply because it does not limit its explanatory resources to the virtues alone." Thus he derives normative standards for right judging from moral judges themselves and therefore demonstrates how norms are the directives for the right appropriation of the virtues themselves. The claim that all moral traditions share a fundamental core, which amounts to a universally valid morality, appears to me to be defensible only if the core in question is described at such a high level of generality as to be virtually empty, and even then, it is difficult to arrive at a statement of principles that would be universally acceptable . . . Yet this does not mean that we need to approach moral dialogue with due humility and relatively modest goals. We may not arrive at a universal ethic in order to develop a basis for a workable moral consensus on a wide range of issues. 77 Elsewhere she states:
In my view the cumulative weight of arguments against a strong universalist view of morality is by now overwhelming. Too many considerations point to the conclusion that moral systems are dependent in a variety of ways on the particular convictions and practices of the communities out of which they emerge. This does not necessarily imply that moral judgments have no basis at all in realities that are independent of our collective and individual judgments. Indeed one of the attractive features of the version of the natural law that I will present here is its focus on the variety of ways in which pre-conventional aspects of human life give rise to and place constraints upon our moral practices. 78 Lisa Sowle Cahill responded critically by exploring "actual intercultural moral and policy consensus and the character of practical reason, in order to nuance the idea of a global common good and to strengthen the prospect of finding global ethics." 79 In light of her investigations, Cahill writes:
More credence need not be given to postmodern agnostic theory about the possibility of a common morality, than to the evidence of a remarkable convergence of ethically-motivated action in the present global system . . . The most important and visible areas of change-human rights, women's rights and the environment-display a unity of moral vision, a common commitment to redressing imbalance of power and well-being so that marginal persons, groups, and nature can flourish. Inclusiveness, equality and solidarity are uniting values.
Cahill concludes: "Perhaps greater success can be achieved by an internally diverse and participatory approach that reaffirms commonality and even global ethics in a prophetic mandate for solidarity in the common good."
80
Research Talk
One of the finest articles I read this year (2003) was by Jean Porter where she takes me and others to task for our understanding of Abelard. Basically, many of us have been working under an assumption, now proven wrong by Porter, that when Abelard argued for the intention that it alone and not the moral value of the action itself entered into the objective criteria for moral judgment. Upholding the former does not preclude but rather, as Porter argues, presupposes the latter. 81 Reading that article I was struck by the possible "high ethical road" of theological disagreement. Porter conveyed that effectively as she made her case against us. Patrick McCormick captures similarly the importance of being able to do critical, but respectful theological investigations in a climate of mutual respect and due process. In the light of the mandatum, McCormick offers papal teaching on labor as a source for articulating guidelines for Church leadership to insure a fair workspace for Catholic theologians. 82 Jeffrey Stout offers an even more relevant insight when he considers a newly edited work by Eugene F. Rogers. He notes as praiseworthy what I have observed throughout this "Note" from McDonagh and Curran to Tanner and Gaziaux, that inclusion rather than exclusion and complements
